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518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
just over eight hundred pages, a prodigious undertaking in any event.
The book's primary market will undoubtedly be among practicing
lawyers, and its effectiveness can really only be tested by practitioner
use of the book. If the success of the Illinois volume is any indication,
the federal version is likely to meet a warm reception. Nevertheless,
the prudent prospective purchaser might be well advised to await publi-
cation of a second edition, which would incorporate the new FRE as
enacted by Congress. Based upon the history of the Illinois volume,
a second edition might be expected within the next year. But, for the
attorney who is not bothered by the necessity to use the promised pocket
part supplementation, the amount of investment required for this volume
seems well worth the potential reward.
RICHARD W. STERLING
,
JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.
By Kathryn Griffith.' University of Oklahoma Press, 1973.
Pp. xi, 251. $8.95.
Kathryn Griffith has written a book devoted primarily to the political
philosophy of Learned Hand, with particular focus on his view of the
role of the federal judiciary in our tripartite and federal system of gov-
vernment. As Ms. Griffith states: "[Judge Hand's] breadth of interest
makes his work of special relevance to students of political theory and
philosophy, as well as of law,"' and her book should have some appeal
to persons in any of those classifications. Nevertheless, Ms. Griffith's
classification of the "special relevance" of Judge Hand's work and the
consequent separation of students of the law from students of political
theory and philosophy points out a major weakness of the book. Ms.
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University.
2. K. GmiFFrrH, JuDGE LEARNED HAND AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JuDIcIARY
15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GSUFFrrH]. This book was a recent monthly selection
of the Lawyers Literary Guild Book Club, offered with L. HAND, THE Srnur OF
LmERTY: PAPERs AND ADDRESSEs OF LEARNED HAND. (3d ed. I. Dillard 1974) [here.
inafter cited as THE SPnTrr OF LmERTY].
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Griffith, who is not an attorney,3 does not integrate these three classi-
fications, but rather approaches her work from a political scientist's per-
spective. While showing great attention to the writings of other politi-
cal scientists, she gives minimal attention to legal scholars other than
Judge Hand or those specifically addressing themselves to Judge Hand.
Learned Hand certainly does ask "what are undeniably the right and
the difficult questions,' 4 but a number of other legal scholars have
asked the same questions in regard to the role of our judiciary. Her
lack of attention to legal scholarship leaves the lawyer with a sense of
incompleteness.
Still, "Learned Hand does not belong to the lawyers alone,"5 and his
philosophy should be discussed and widely circulated, whatever the
emphasis. Ms. Griffith's book appropriately reminds us that our own
views on judicial review, on judicial restraint versus judicial ac-
tivism, if they are to be valid, must be based on more than simply
a determination whether the legislature or the judiciary is currently the
better reflector of our own politics. Times have changed and will keep
changing, as have the philosophical leanings of our legislatures and
courts. A philosophy supporting judicial activism or judicial restraint
which is based on no more than whose ox is being gored at the moment
will ultimately be inconsistent and will come back to haunt its exponent.
Rather we must base our position on a more general theory concerning
the role of each component in our tripartite, federal system of govern-
ment.6
Ms. Griffith's book discusses the proper role of our federal courts.
This discussion is important because of the depth of, and respect given,
the views of Learned Hand on the subject. The dispute is a very basic
one which benefits from a current perspective, a perspective which re-
minds us that the dispute is much more than academic and that it lives
on beyond Marbury v. Madison.1 Ms. Griffith, however, seemingly is
content to collect and restate; thus she adds little that is new to the
debate. This makes her work of primary value as a refresher for those
3. Ms. Griffith has a Ph.D. in political science. See note 1 supra.
4. Wyzanski, Introduction to L. HAN], THE BrLL OF RIGrrs at xiii (1972).
5. Dilliard, Introduction to THE SPMrT OF LiBERTY, at vi.
6. See GRIF=rrH 232-33. Hand will "be remembered and honored for restructuring
the dialogue about restraint and activism in judicial review so that both must be defended
on the basis of the fundamental assumptions about the American Democratic System."
Id. at 232.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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who have studied Hand and the questions he raises and an initiation
for those who have not.
McGeorge Bundy, in his review of Learned Hand's only book, The
Bill of Rights, states: "Time after time Judge Hand clears up in a page
matters which are understood at ten times their length in other writ-
ings."8 Ms. Griffith's book seems to be one of those "other writings."
Her style is wordy and repetitious. Although her book serves the laud-
able purpose of disseminating Learned Hand's views and thereby con-
tributes to the important debate over the courts' proper role in our sys-
tem of government, if her point is not understood the first time she
makes it, I doubt it will be understood the second, third, or fourth.
I.
Learned Hand seems fondly remembered and intellectually re-
spected by even his severest critics. Judge Jerome Frank called him
"our wisest judge."9  The press referred to him as the "Tenth Justice"
of the Supreme Court."0 He has the distinction of being the lower
court judge most often "cited by name in opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States [and] in academic publications."" And
yet there is no "biography" of Learned Hand.'2 To date his life has
been relegated to introductions,' 3 short summaries in early chapters,' 4
and law review and magazine articles.'
Though Ms. Griffith's book is certainly not meant to be a biography,
she does devote her first chapter to a sketchy anecdotal presentation
of Hand's life. Judge Hand's life with his wife and three daughters
is noted only to conclude that he had an "obvious affection' 0 for them
all and that he
8. Bundy, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ. 944, 948 (1958).
9. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, at v (1949).
10. Wyzanski, supra note 4, at v.
11. Id. At least this was true as of 1963 when Judge Wyzanski wrote his introduc-
tion.
12. Professor Gerald Gunther, currently at work on a biography of Judge Hand, is
in the process of filling this void. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Mod-
ern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L R-v. 719,
719 & n.1 (1975).
13. E.g., THE SPIrr OF LMERTY; H. SHANKS, THE ART AND CRAFr OF JutoINo
(1968).
14. E.g., GRwFrni; M. ScmcK, LEARNEn HAND's COURT (1970).
15. See GRI~rraH 356-63 (bibliography).
16. Id. at 6.
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possessed the ability to relax and enjoy the simplest pleasures of family
life. To his children and then his grandchildren he told stores [sic] of
Br'er Rabbit while he went hippity-hopping across the room and regaled
them with tales about an imaginary character named Marge, who was
well intentioned but was constantly in trouble with the law. Another
favorite was his pantomime of the Crooked Mouth Family in which he
took the part of each trying to blow out a candle. At the end he would
wet his fingers and snuff out the flame. When he played cowboys and
Indians with his grandchildren, he used a wastebasket for a headdress
and, according to his son-in-law, was not one but a whole tribe of Indi-
ans cavorting around the house. As part of the annual Christmas cele-
bration he always sang songs from Gilbert and Sullivan. 17
He is described as a man who was a fine storyteller and a gifted
mimic.
Once, after delighting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes with ribald sea
chanteys, he said that he hoped that Holmes had not taken him for a
"mere vaudevillian." . . . When in a puckish mood, he delighted his
audiences with stories delivered in Irish, Yiddish, and Italian accents.
His impersonation of William Jennings Bryan addressing a political
meeting in Jersey City was a favorite of Justice Felix Frankfurter.' 8
These anecdotes seem to be the kind of stories told on a close per-
sonal friend, the kind that have an added meaning for the storyteller.
That added meaning is conveyed to the listener, if at all, by the story-
teller's obvious close feelings of affection and respect for the object of
the story. That feeling of warmth towards the subject Learned Hand
is missing here, however, as Ms. Griffith merely relates seriatim these
second-hand anecdotes, giving one the impression that Hand was an
intellectual giant professionally and a buffoon at home.
Ms. Griffith has attempted to capture the personal life of the man
with a few selected examples of his actions, but we are not given
enough examples to build an image of the man. Instead we are left
with too many factual questions to which no answer is attempted and
which would seem better unasked than left unanswered. Ms. Griffith
tells us that as a youth, Learned Hand "chose to forego the certainties
of divine absolutes." She then states that "[d]uring the last years of
his life he and Mrs. Hand read the Gospels aloud, though he remained
troubled by the miracles reported in them."'19 Can this possibly sum
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. Id. at 8.
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up his religious doubts in later life? It is this kind of tidbit that needs
fuller explanation and that leaves nagging doubts in the reader's mind.
In her Preface, the author states that "an understanding of the rela-
tionship between [Hand's] philosophical assumptions and his practice
in political life may illuminate some problems of contemporary Ameri-
can life." 20 In light of this statement of intention, as well as the book's
obvious relevance to the proper conduct of our political leaders, certain
biographical facts directly affecting Judge Hand's political life would
seem to demand some sort of resolution. For example, President Taft
appointed Learned Hand to the federal district court in 1909. In the
presidential election of 1912, however, Judge Hand supported Teddy
Roosevelt against the incumbent, President Taft. Then, in 1913, while
still a federal judge, Hand stood for election to the post of Chief Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals. Ms. Griffith states that Judge
Hand later "explained his action by saying that he 'knew that we had
to break away from the Hanna thing-the control of the nation by big
business.' "21 Without discussing how Judge Hand viewed these ac-
tions, at the time, or in retrospect, Ms. Griffith simply concludes that
he "must have regretted his action in light of his subsequent position
regarding the necessity of judges to remain uncommitted in political
matters."2 But did Judge Hand in fact later regret his political activ-
ity? Does his explanation about "the Hanna thing" suggest that the
end justified the means? Can we explain his actions simply by attribu-
ting them to the shortsightedness of youth?2 3 Did Hand ever offer any
more complete explanation? In any event-and I am unaware that this
particular point has been given more complete attention anywhere
else-I would have preferred some explanation, even if only that none
is available.24
20. Id. at vii. The application of Hand's philosophy to contemporary problems is
left to the reader.
21. Id. at 5. Ms. Griffith offers no authority for the quotation from Judge Hand.
22. Id.
23. Irving Dilliard, in his introduction to The Spirit of Liberty, seems to suggest
that Judge Hand's behavior in these two instances can be attributed to his youthfulness.
Dilliard, supra note 5, at xii. In 1909, when he was appointed to the bench, Judge Hand
was 37 years old.
24. At about the same time, in 1916, in response to a request from the publisher,
Judge Hand wrote a letter opposing the removal of The Masses from newsstands in New
York City. A New York state legislative committee was then preparing for hearings
on the publication's exclusion. Judge Hand must have foreseen the possibility that this
matter might soon be litigated in the court on which he sat. Yet, he chose not to remain
"uncommitted." See Gunther, supra note 12, at 723-24. When the constitutionality of
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I.
In Part HI, Ms. Griffith gets down to the main focus of her book,
beginning with a discussion of Hand's views about the nature of man
and man's values. Judge Hand rejected absolute and eternal truths,
believing there to be "no absolute criteria by which [man] may judge
the truth or wisdom of his choices . .. . Everyone must make his
own choices for himself, and by his free choices, he creates and defines
his own essence.28  Free choice is necessary to man's creativity and,
therefore, to his survival. This "importance of free choice to human
life suggests the need for tolerance of other choices. ' 27  Yet freedom
of choice and tolerance of other choices were not absolutes for Hand,
but rather were limited by the necessity of society, a value which man
must recognize and weigh in his personal choices. 28  Man must under-
stand that he has an interest in a continuation of society29 and that this
interest limits his free choice.
The difficult question then becomes what is necessary for the contin-
ued existence of society and, consistent with the need for tolerance of
the choices of others, how can one defend against what is perceived
as a threat to the existence of that society?3 0  Is that threat ever any
more or any less than another's exercise of free choice? And if the
answer is yes, then how can one decide when it is so? If everyone
is to be allowed to search for his own truths, what happens when one
excluding this publication from the mails actually came before Judge Hand in 1917, he
decided in favor of the publisher. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
25. G~iFurr 48. There is no "standard outside man by which [these values]
can be measured." Id. at 52.
26. Id. at 50-51. While all men are not capable of truly creative choice, it is essen-
tial, and it is enough, "that the opportunity remain open to those who have the capacity
and desire to create." Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 53.
28. But for society to persist, [Hand] thought that the concept of self-interest
shared by its members must include an awareness that each gains certain ad-
vantages from the community and thus must contribute to its well-being. "A
society in which each is willing to surrender only that for which he can see
a personal equivalent, is not a society at all; it is a group already in process
of dissolution. . . . No Utopia. . . will automatically emerge from a regime
of unbridled individualism, be it ever so rugged.
Id. at 74, quoting L. HAND, Liberty, in THE Spuur OF LMERTY 150.
29. See GRIFrFH 74. Even the necessity of "society" to the continued existence
of man is not an absolute. Rather, Hand would leave room for the possibility that this
necessity may not be universally true now or true in the indefinite future. "What is
true today may be proved false tomorrow." Id. at 55.
30. See id. at 198-99.
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person's exercise of that right infringes on another's exercise of that
right? A person has the right to make determinations comporting with
his own value judgments of how his society should be maintained, but
what happens when these determinations conflict with the way another
person believes that the same society should be maintained? Hand's
answer
appears to be found in the determination of community values through
the democratic process. . . . His understanding of the procedure of
democracy included the freedom of each to work within the prescribed
framework to secure community acceptance of his personally chosen
values.31
Thus, the line, which the individual's exercise of free choice may
not cross, is drawn by a government responsive to majorities.3 2
To Hand a workable balance between the needs of the individual for
freedom and the requirements of society appeared to rest in distinguish-
ing between areas of common interest and concern, which should be sub-
ject to common decisions, and those of individual concern, which must
remain the sole province of the individual self.33
31. Id. at 58. The author recognizes that there are differences, sometimes great dif-
ferences, in the opportunities for expression of one idea relative to another. "Hand ex-
pressed great concern with the increasing tendency of the power of mass media and
propaganda to destroy meaningful debate." Id. at 59. Ms. Griffith does not, however,
suggest how to deal with this problem or how Hand felt this problem should be handled,
other than to refer to "the right and necessity of society to protect itself." Id. at 60.
This may be a workable answer if the propaganda is attempting to convince a minority
to secure the desired end by violation of the will of the majority. The ultimate end
to which this sort of propaganda is directed, however, presumably would be designed to
convince a sufficient number of the members of society that a course of action against
their interests is actually in their interests. Hand's protection against propaganda di-
rected to this end would seem to be "the competition of the market." Id. at 59, quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. Hand did recognize that our government is often responsive not to majorities
but to aggressive minorities, and that the strong dominate in a democratic society. He
attributed this unresponsiveness to majorities to three causes: apathy, conformity, and
mass media or mass propaganda. See GiurrH 70-72. With respect to apathy, Ms.
Griffith states:
[1In place of intelligent attention and capacity [Hand] saw apathy so deep no
scandal, no disclosures of corruption seemed to stir the voters. It was conceiv-
able to him that things might become "uncomfortable enough to arouse them,
but, given reasonable opportunity for personal favors, and a not too irksome
control, they are content to abdicate their sovereignty and to be fleeced, if the
shepherds will only shear them in their sleep."
Id. at 70, quoting L. HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities, in TnE SP=Rr
oF LrBERTY 94. Nevertheless, Hand did not believe that this apathy was "necessarily
destructive of democracy" so long as the channels for "political change through an ac-
cepted and peaceful process" are kept open. Id. at 77.
33. Id. at 68.Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:518]
Our Constitution was designed, in part, to effect this balance between
the individual and the various governmental structures, state and fed-
eral, of our society. But who is to decide how these constitutional pro-
visions should be applied to a given set of facts-where lies the ulti-
mate responsibility for the preservation of our liberty?
III.
"It is well known that Judge Hand believe[d] that the courts should
not seek to play a significant role in the preservation of liberty."34
Consistent with Judge Hand's personal values, and based on his inter-
pretation of the Constitution, he felt that the legislature, the nearest
representative of the will of the majority, should be the primary force
to this end. It is this part of Hand's philosophy which is the primary
focus of Parts I and IV of Ms. Griffith's book.
Contrary to Judge Hand's view of their proper function, our courts
do "play a significant role in the preservation of liberty." In this en-
deavor they use the tools of judicial review and statutory interpretation.
Judge Hand found constitutional justification, in the supremacy clause,
for judicial review of state actions.35 The Constitution is not so ex-
plicit, however, in regard to judicial review of actions of the congres-
sional and executive branches of the federal government. To Hand,
this latter type of judicial review violated the principle of separation
of powers. Nevertheless,
Judge Hand believed that there are good and sufficient reasons for in-
ferring this power. The legitimacy of judicial review is to be found in
the practical necessity for the function to be fulfilled. The primary pur-
pose a constitution serves is to allocate political power, and it is neces-
sary for some agency to have authority to declare when the allocation
has been disturbed. If the judicial branch had not assumed this power
it is likely either that the legislative branch [with its power of the purse]
would have absorbed all power or that inconsistencies would have de-
veloped as each branch made independent judgments, so that coherent
government would have been impossible.30 Thus, on the basis of ex-
34. Jaffee, Book Review, 66 HA&v. L. REv. 939, 941 (1953).
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
36. Our recent experience with "Watergate" might suggest a third alternative, that
is, that the executive branch might have "absorbed all power."
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perience and necessity, the power is justified.37
Thus, although Hand did not deny the appropriateness of judicial re-
view, his theories on its proper origin led him to believe that the court
should use this tool with great restraint. The role of the court should
be limited to considering the decision-maker's jurisdiction to make the
decision, as opposed to the relative merits of the decision itself. This
type of judicial review primarily serves to allocate power among the
individual, the state, and the various branches of the federal govern-
ment, 38 by determining who should exercise the authority, but not how
it should be exercised.
This theory of judicial review would directly enforce the liberty of
the individual only when the Constitution provides that the individual,
and not the government, is the proper authority to make a particular
decision. Government interference with that decision would be uncon-
stitutional. Such a determination would seldom be made, however, at
least in Hand's view, because he believed that the Bill of Rights was
not sufficiently specific for judicial enforcement. "Hand referred to
the general principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights as 'stately admoni-
tions' which are beyond analysis"3 9 and "believed that the fundamental
37. G iFir 105-06.
38. See id. at 211; cf. id. at 223. As an example of contemporary problems illumi-
nated by Hand's view of the court as an allocator of power, one might consider the re-
cent and heated dispute between the executive and legislative branches on "executive
privilege," culminating in the Supreme Court's allocation of federal power in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). A second example, involving both separation
of powers and federalism, is the controversy about impoundment. The abstention doc-
trine exemplifies judicial allocation of power between the federal government and the
states. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Supreme Court's deci-
sions in regard to the constitutionality of anti-abortion statutes can be interpreted as the
judicial allocation of power between the individual and the government. See text ac-
companying note 41 infra. Each of these are examples of courts declaring when the
constitutional "allocation has been disturbed," thereby curtailing the "inconsistencies
[developing] as each branch made independent judgments." See text accompanying
note 36 supra.
39. Gm xmnr 131. Hand did believe, however, that certain provisions of the Bill
of Rights created rights judicially enforceable on behalf of those accused of criminal
acts. Ms. Griffith states:
[When the court was operating in what he regarded as its primary sphere,
[Hand] was willing to exercise a full measure of judicial power. These areas
included statutory interpretation; the amendments which are explicit enough to
give guidance to the court in providing full rights to persons charged and stand-
ing trial for crime; the common law which is uniquely the responsibility for
making judgments that might have otherwise been regarded as legislative (that
is, antitrust, torts, patents, negligence, and care); and the First Amendment
Washington University Open Scholarship
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political conflicts suggested by the Bill of Rights must be resolved by
the legislative branch."4
Though Ms. Griffith does not discuss it, Hand's belief in the role of
the court as the allocator of power must go hand in hand with his belief
in the lack of judicial power to define and enforce the Bill of Rights.
Were the former view to be adopted without the latter, the activist
judge would hardly miss a step. To place the court in the role of pre-
server of individual liberties, the judge would simply find a constitu-
tional protection for the individual's authority, as against the govern-
ment's authority, to make a given choice. The individual's authority
could no doubt be found in any number of Bill of Rights provisions.41
Such an interpretation of the Constitution would, however, be open to
the same charges of abuse and uncertainty as are substantive due pro-
cess and the new equal protection.
But is the role of the federal judiciary to be limited to deciding
whether the proper authority has made the decision and to interpreting
that which the legislature has the jurisdiction to enact? If the legisla-
ture's resolution of the value conflicts involved in questions properly
before that body must be allowed to stand, is there to be any assurance
that all of the appropriate values, including the constitutional values,
have been weighed into the legislative process? Do we simply assume
from the fact of enactment that appropriate constitutional considera-
tions have been addressed and resolved? Or is the fact of enactment
by proper authority the only constitutional consideration that is judi-
cially appropriate? If a legislature does not always weigh all of the
appropriate constitutional values when it enacts a law,42 Judge Hand
believed that one benefit of judicial restraint would be to compel Con-
cases which arise under statutory law.
Id. at 201-02.
40. Id. at 131.
41. For a discussion of the abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in terms of allocations of decision-making au-
thority, see Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreward: Toward a Model of
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAxv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
42. For a discussion of the validity of such an assumption in regard to the enact-
ment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. 197, as amended Act of Jan. 1, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-643, 84 Stat. 1880 (codi-
fied in scattered titles of U.S.C.), see Harris, Reflections; The New Justice, THE NEw
YoRKEm, March 25, 1972, at 44, 57-59. Mr. Harris reports that some members of Con-
gress were of the opinion that the bill was unconstitutional, but felt it politically unwise
to vote against it. They voted for the legislation expressing the opinion that the Supreme
Court would declare the statute unconstitutional and that they need not be troubled.
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gress to assume its proper responsibilities in this regard. This legisla-
tive neglect of constitutional responsibility is seen as an effect of judi-
cial review rather than a cause.
Ms. Griffith states that Hand believed that the courts had a responsi-
bility, in regard to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, "to satisfy
themselves that the legislature has weighed the values implicit in the
issue. 48 Presumably she means "the issue" before the court and that
the courts have a responsibility to interpret statutes in light of constitu-
tional values when the court is faced with a situation that the legislature
had not envisioned.44 When a literal reading of a statute requires its
application to a situation that the legislature had not considered and,
arguably, to which the legislature had not intended that the statute ap-
ply, the court's role is to interpret the statute by finding and applying
the legislature's intent.45
Ms. Griffith concludes that this judicial "interpretation" differs from
"judicial legislation" primarily because of the "spirit or philosophy with
which a judge approaches his task. 48 She is either suggesting a rather
43. Gum'rir 202. In regard to the legislator's responsibilities for constitutional in-
terpretation, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
44. See, e.g., id. at 133. But Ms. Griffith also states:
Learned Hand thought it proper to apply the same standard of constitution-
ality to all laws relating to the First Amendment, the due-process and equal-
protection clauses: Has the legislature made a sincere attempt to evaluate the
competing values involved?
Id. at 153. If Ms. Griffith is suggesting some broader rule for the court in deciding
whether "the legislature has weighed the values implicit in the issue" before the legisla-
ture, that is, that the court will guarantee that the legislature is responsive to the consti-
tutional values involved in a given piece of legislation, then she leaves us high and dry.
She does not suggest how the court would determine whether the legislature has weighed
the appropriate values and what the court is to do if it finds that the legislature has
not done so. What can the court do in the face of a legislative statement that all appro-
priate values have been weighed? Can the court require that the legislature explain ex-
actly what values have been considered? If not, is the court's role limited to those rare
cases in which it is clear that certain values were not taken into account? But from
what source could the court derive such a power without also deriving a power of judicial
review? Such a power would in some ways be a greater violation of the principle of
separation of powers than judicial review itself. If the court finds that the legislature
has failed to consider appropriate values or if the court cannot determine whether or
not certain values were considered, does it declare the act unconstitutional, does it re-
mand to the legislature, or does it simply make an admonitory declaration? And what
is the constitutional authority for any of these actions? Is not a judiciary exercising
some control over legislative assessment of values likely to end up playing some "signifi-
cant role in the preservation of liberty?" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
45. See, e.g., GpwaT= 171, 177.
46. Id. at 179.Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:518]
Utopian view of how most judges approach their work or making a dis-
tinction without a difference. She leaves the impression that Hand
substituted a potentially far-reaching theory of statutory interpretation
for substantive due process. 47  The differences between the two, how-
ever, are significant. Judicial interpretation leaves the activist judge
with a tool, the misuse of which is more easily recognizable as an
abuse-a tool, therefore, which is less likely to be abused. In addition,
it was Hand's view generally that if the legislature meant for the statute
to apply to the situation before the court, it was irrelevant that a judge
believed that the Bill of Rights forbade such application. The legisla-
ture's resolution of that value conflict must stand.
IV.
It is in Chapter XI (Part IV) of her book that Ms. Griffith reminds
us that our own views on judicial review must be based on more than
simply a determination whether the legislature or the judiciary is cur-
rently the better reflector of our own politics. Ms. Griffith reminds
us, for example, that "[u]ntil 1954 the Supreme Court acted 'more like
a brake than a motor in the social mechanism,' and the usual effects
of judicial review were to retard change and to affirm the social, eco-
nomic, and political relationships already existing in society. '48 Only
since 1954, beginning with the desegregation cases, has the Court be-
come the "motor." Ms. Griffith notes that the Court's "increasingly
active role in the affirmative decision-making process of the commu-
nity" was emphasized by the "[e]xtension of judicial power into the
realm of legislative apportionment. ' 9  These cases, says Ms. Griffith,
underscore "[t]he very important practical significance of the differ-
ence between the views of activism and restraint upon the American
democratic system . . . . The proper definition of judicial review is
not merely a theoretical problem." 50
Ms. Griffith states that the shift to judicial activism has led to a court
mainly concerned with the
achievement of a specific goal and the right result in a controversy rather
than [with] the judicial process by which the Court achieves that
end.
47. See, e.g., id. at 84-85.
48. Id. at 204 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 206.
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A judge who is dedicated to the exercise of judicial restraint also seeks
just results, but he is bound more than the activist by limits on his free-
dom to judge ...
An activist is more willing to declare acts of the legislature unconstitu-
tional when they do not accord with his own philosophical beliefs or pol-
icy preferences than is the advocate of judicial restraint who often
searches for some acceptable rationalization for doubtful legislation....
Judge Hand's philosophy and career represent the epitome of judicial
restraint.r1
Ms. Griffith recognizes the concern of Judge Hand, and others, that
judicial activism will lead (and is leading) to a politicized court:
Judge Hand believed that if the courts attempt too much they dissi-
pate their effectiveness and that if they press their own policy views they
invite their own destruction. He assumed that the courts should protect
their energy and prestige for the adjudicatory function, which only they
can serve in the American system.
. . . The authority of law as finally announced by a court comes not
from the person of the judge or any faction of society but from the belief
that the judge, insofar as he has the capacity, voices the will of the com-
munity ....
Hand feared that involvement in "political questions" would deprive
the judges of their capacity for impartiality and deprive the courts of
the people's confidence in their capacity to decide in accordance with
the law. 52
Not only are courts not responsible to the will of the people, they are
not even in a position to gauge the will of the people-that not being
their function, but rather the legislature's.5 3 An additional danger that
Hand recognized as flowing from a "politicized" court was that judicial
51. Id. at 208-10.
52. Id. at 217, 219.
53. It was important to Hand that the courts exercise restraint partly because
judges are not directly responsible to the public but more importantly because
in the American system they should not be responsive to the immediate will
of the people. Representation is the function of the legislature, and the people
are free to bring whatever pressure or influence they can in the political resolu-
tion of issues. But when these same pressures and influences, no matter how
sophisticated and subtle are brought to bear upon the nation's judges, they con-
- stitute an attack upon the judges' judicial competence and integrity. It is as
much the responsibility of the judges to resist this pressure as it is the obliga-
tion of the legislator to take it into account.
Id. at 222.
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appointments would become more and more political; the more politi-
cal that the work of the judge becomes, the greater the role that poli-
tics will play in judicial appointments. 54
It is Ms. Griffith's Chapter XI which I found to be her most interest-
ing. The chapter addresses, though briefly, the practical application
of Hand's philosophy, rather than simply reiterating and rehashing that
philosophy itself. Indeed, the tightening and condensing of chapters
III through X and the expansion of Chapter XI would, in my view,
have substantially improved the book.
G. MICHAEL FENNER*
54. See id. at 220. In this regard, Ms. Griffith briefly discusses the move to im-
peach Justice Douglas, the controversies surrounding Justice Fortas, and the nominations
of Judges William Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court. There
is no assumption that judicial selection in the past was not political, only that future
selection may become more political, and more openly political. In one sense this may
have something of a positive side in that it tends to bring into the open a previously
little-discussed basis for judicial selection.
* Associate Professor of Law, Creighton University.
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